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What	does	Andrzej	Duda’s	presidential	election
victory	mean	for	Polish	politics?
Poland’s	ruling	party	is	hoping	that	its	presidential	election	victory	will	encourage	domestic	and
international	elites	to	accept	it	has	a	clear	three-year	run	controlling	all	the	levers	of	state	power	to
continue	with	its	radical	state	reconstruction	programme,	writes	Aleks	Szczerbiak.	The	reelected
President	also	has	a	huge	personal	mandate,	giving	him	the	potential	to	carve	out	a	more	independent
role,	but	to	do	so	he	will	need	a	more	distinctive	political	agenda	and	a	stronger	support	base.
Earlier	this	month,	incumbent	Andrzej	Duda	–	who	was	supported	by	the	right-wing	Law	and	Justice	(PiS)	grouping,
Poland’s	ruling	party	since	autumn	2015	–	won	a	closely-fought	presidential	election	run-off	against	Warsaw	mayor
Rafał	Trzaskowski	–	who	was	backed	by	the	liberal-centrist	Civic	Platform	(PO),	the	country’s	governing	party
between	2007-15	and	currently	the	main	opposition	grouping	–	by	51%	to	49%.	In	what	was	effectively	a	plebiscite
on	the	Law	and	Justice	government,	Duda’s	narrow	victory	was	secured	on	the	basis	of	a	68.2%	turnout,	the
second	highest	in	any	election	since	the	return	of	democracy	in	1989,	reflecting	the	fact	Poles	are	evenly	divided
and	polarised	in	their	attitudes	towards	the	ruling	party.
Duda’s	success	was	secured	by	mobilising	Law	and	Justice’s	core	supporters	in	small-town	provincial	Poland
where	election	turnout	is	traditionally	lower.	The	most	significant	increase	in	voting	between	the	first	and	second
rounds	was	precisely	in	the	smaller	towns	and	rural	areas	that	constitute	Law	and	Justice’s	electoral	heartlands.
Duda	made	great	efforts	to	reach	out	to	these	often-forgotten	areas	and	earlier	this	year	fulfilled	his	pledge	to
become	the	first	President	to	visit	every	one	of	Poland’s	380	administrative	counties	during	his	term	of	office.
Duda’s	core	appeal	was	as	the	guarantor	of	Law	and	Justice’s	extremely	popular	social	spending	and	welfare
programmes	directed	especially	at	poorer	families	and	households	who	felt	frustrated	that	they	had	not	shared
sufficiently	in	Poland’s	post-communist	economic	transformation.	This	was	part	of	a	claim	that	Law	and	Justice	was
the	first	party	to	show	as	much	respect	to	citizens	living	in	the	provinces	as	those	in	larger	urban	agglomerations,
including	respecting	their	more	traditional	culturally	conservative	values	and	views	on	issues	such	as	the	legal
status	of	sexual	minorities.	Duda’s	appeal,	therefore,	dovetailed	with	the	party’s	broader	political	project	which
some	commentators	term	the	‘redistribution	of	prestige’,	whereby	ordinary	Poles	who	previously	felt	themselves	to
be	second-class	citizens	started	to	regain	a	sense	of	dignity	and	self-respect.
Completing	the	judicial	overhaul
Duda’s	victory	is	crucially	important	because	it	gives	Law	and	Justice	a	clear	three-year	run	until	the	next
parliamentary	election	during	which	time	it	can	continue	to	push	ahead	with	its	radical	state	reconstruction
programme.	Given	that	the	ruling	party	lacks	the	three-fifths	legislative	majority	required	to	over-turn	a	presidential
veto,	a	victory	for	Duda’s	challenger	would	have	been	a	disaster	for	Law	and	Justice,	seriously	hampering	its	ability
to	govern	effectively	and	possibly	precipitating	an	early	parliamentary	election.
A	key	priority	will	be	completing	the	government’s	radical	but	fiercely-contested	overhaul	of	the	judicial	system,
which	the	liberal-centrist	and	left-wing	opposition,	and	Poland’s	legal	establishment,	have	strongly	criticised	as	an
attack	on	the	rule	of	law	and	infringement	of	the	key	democratic	principle	of	constitutional	separation	of	powers.
Warning	of	a	drift	towards	authoritarian	rule,	the	government’s	opponents	argue	that,	by	putting	judicial
appointments	under	political	control,	these	reforms	allowed	Law	and	Justice	to	pack	the	courts	with	its	own,	hand-
picked	nominees,	and	thereby	undermined	their	independence.	Law	and	Justice’s	sweeping	judicial	reforms	also
triggered	an	ongoing	conflict	between	Poland	and	the	EU	political	establishment.
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The	government’s	supporters,	on	the	other	hand,	argued	that	the	reforms	were	sorely	needed	because	Polish
courts	were	too	slow,	deeply	inefficient	and	tolerated	frequent	irregularities	and	corrupt	practices.	Law	and	Justice
believes	that,	following	the	country’s	flawed	transition	to	democracy	in	1989,	the	judiciary,	like	many	key	Polish
institutions,	was	expropriated	by	an	extremely	well-entrenched,	and	often	deeply	corrupt,	post-communist	elite,
which	then	co-opted	a	new	legal	establishment	that	perpetuated	its	legacy.	The	judicial	elite,	they	said,	operated	as
a	‘state	within	a	state’	incapable	of	reforming	itself,	so	making	judges	and	their	supervisory	organs	more
accountable	to	elected	bodies	was	both	justifiable	and	in	line	with	practices	in	other	established	democracies.	Duda
will	continue	to	approve	new	judicial	appointments	and	legislation	preventing	any	attempts	by	the	legal
establishment	to	block	Law	and	Justice’s	reforms.	The	ruling	party	may	also	try	and	find	ways	of	accelerating
judicial	turnover	by,	for	example,	re-organising	the	Polish	court	system.
Gagging	critical	media	or	ensuring	greater	pluralism?
Another	highly	contentious	policy	area	is	likely	to	be	Law	and	Justice’s	plans	for	media	reform.	The	opposition
argues	that	under	Law	and	Justice,	Polish	public	TV	has	turned	into	a	government	propaganda	tool,	and	during	the
presidential	election	campaign	Trzaskowski	called	for	the	scrapping	of	its	news	and	information	service.	However,
Law	and	Justice	argues	that	public	TV	brings	greater	pluralism	to	a	broader	media	landscape	which	it	says	has	an
in-built	structural	bias	favouring	the	liberal-left.
It	also	believes	that	ensuring	media	balance	in	Poland	currently	depends	solely	upon	Law	and	Justice	retaining
influence	within	public	TV.	It	fears	that	if	there	was	a	change	of	government	not	only	would	Law	and	Justice	lose
access	to	this	crucial	element	of	its	communication	strategy	but	also	sections	of	the	privately-owned	media	that	are
currently	adopting	a	more	neutral	political	stance	(such	as	the	Polsat	TV	station)	would	quickly	revert	to	their
instinctive	liberal-left	bias.	Consequently,	Law	and	Justice	will	be	looking	to	extend	its	influence	in	privately-owned
media.
One	means	of	achieving	this	are	proposals	to	‘deconcentrate’	and	‘repolonise’	the	media.	Law	and	Justice	argues
that	foreign-owned	media	conglomerates	openly	interfered	in	and	tried	to	tip	the	scales	in	favour	of	the	opposition
during	the	presidential	election.	For	example,	the	party	was	furious	when,	in	the	final	days	of	the	campaign,	Law
and	Justice	felt	that	Poland’s	most	popular	newspaper	‘Fakt’,	which	is	owned	by	the	German-Swiss	Ringier	Axel
Springer	group,	reported	one	of	Duda’s	presidential	pardons	involving	a	child	abuse	case	in	a	highly	misleading
way.
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‘Deconcentration’	would	involve	placing	limits	on	a	publisher’s	share	of	the	media	market	thereby	obliging	some
foreign-owned	concerns	to	sell	their	share	to	Polish	companies,	possibly	including	state-owned	enterprises	or
private	investors	more	sympathetic	to	Law	and	Justice.	The	government’s	critics	argue	that	such	plans	would	be	a
pretext	for	the	ruling	party	to	close	down	critical	media	and	that	it	would	be	hard	to	draw	up	such	legislation	without
breaking	EU	law.	Law	and	Justice	says	that	foreign-owned	media	companies	exercise	too	much	influence	in	Polish
internal	affairs	and	such	measures	would	ensure	greater	media	pluralism.
Coming	to	terms	with	Law	and	Justice
Beyond	the	policy	sphere,	Law	and	Justice	is	banking	on	the	fact	that	Duda’s	victory	will	encourage	the	business
and	cultural	elites,	and	those	working	in	public	administration,	who	may	have	been	hedging	their	bets	up	until	now
to	come	to	terms	with	the	fact	that	there	will	be	a	Law	and	Justice	government	controlling	all	the	main	state
institutions	for	at	least	another	three	years.	They	will	also	be	hoping	that	some	opposition	politicians	will	defect	to
the	governing	camp.
This	could	help	Law	and	Justice	increase	its	narrow	five-seat	majority	in	the	Sejm,	the	more	powerful	lower	house
of	the	Polish	parliament,	and	regain	control	of	the	Senate,	Poland’s	second	chamber	which	is	less	powerful	but	can
delay	legislation	for	up	to	30	days	and	block	some	key	appointments.	Currently,	51	out	of	100	Senators	are	aligned
with	the	opposition.	The	ruling	party	will	also	be	looking	to	increase	its	influence	in	the	country’s	16	regional
councils,	which	play	a	major	role	in	distributing	EU	funds	and	are	a	key	source	of	local	party	patronage	but	half	of
which	are	currently	controlled	by	the	opposition.
Law	and	Justice	is	hoping	that	the	same	process	of	pragmatic	acceptance	will	play	out	at	the	international	level,
particularly	within	the	EU	where,	the	opposition	argues,	Poland	has	been	increasingly	marginalised	during	the	last
five	years.	In	fact,	Law	and	Justice	has	for	some	time	pursued	a	twin-track	approach	to	its	EU	relations.	On	the	one
hand,	it	accepts	that	there	will	be	disagreements	with	the	EU	political	establishment	on	moral-cultural	issues,	where
Law	and	Justice	rejects	what	it	sees	as	a	hegemonic	EU	liberal-left	consensus	that	undermines	Poland’s	traditional
values	and	national	identity.
It	argues	that	policy	clashes	with	the	major	EU	powers	are	inevitable	because	Poland	often	has	interests	that
conflict	with	the	dominant	Franco-German	axis,	and	Law	and	Justice	is,	the	party	claims,	pursuing	a	more	robust
and	assertive	approach	than	its	predecessors.	The	party	also	recognises	that	the	EU	political	establishment	largely
agrees	with	the	Polish	opposition	and	legal	establishment’s	argument	that	Law	and	Justice’s	actions	in	areas	such
as	judicial	reform	are	undermining	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law	(although	it	strongly	contests	these	claims).
At	the	same	time,	Law	and	Justice	has	tried	to	present	Poland	as	a	positive	and	constructive	EU	member,	arguing
that	these	disagreements	do	not	prevent	it	from	developing	normal	pragmatic	day-to-day	working	relations	on
bread-and-butter	policy	issues.	It	is	now	hoping	that,	for	all	their	political	differences,	Duda’s	victory	will	help	to
persuade	the	EU	political	establishment	to	put	contentious	issues	that	could	undermine	broader	strategic	co-
operation	with	Poland,	such	as	‘rule	of	law’	compliance,	on	the	back-burner	and	develop	a	positive	working
relationship	with	a	Law	and	Justice	government	that	they	now	know	will	be	in	office	for	at	least	three	years.
A	key	early	challenge	here	for	Law	and	Justice’s	EU	strategy	is	its	attempt	to	decouple	systemic	‘rule	of	law’
compliance	(which,	Law	and	Justice	argues,	is	difficult	to	measure	objectively)	from	the	disbursement	and
management	of	EU	funds.	The	Polish	government	appears	to	have	had	some	initial	success	on	this	front	at	July’s
European	Council	summit	negotiations	on	the	next	EU	budget	round	and	coronavirus	recovery	fund.
A	more	autonomous	presidency?
Finally,	although	the	election	result	was	extremely	close,	the	very	high	turnout	provides	Duda	with	a	huge	personal
mandate.	This,	together	with	the	fact	that	it	will	be	his	final	presidential	term,	potentially	gives	the	President	much
greater	room	for	manoeuvre	to	carve	out	a	more	independent	political	role	for	himself.	Duda’s	biggest	weakness
during	his	first	term	was	his	vulnerability	to	the	accusation	that	he	was	marginalised	in	key	state	policy	decisions
and	simply	acted	as	the	government’s	‘notary’.	Now	he	could,	for	example,	try	and	develop	some	new	political
initiatives	aimed	at	de-escalating	the	conflict	between	the	government	and	opposition.	Duda	made	precisely	such
an	apparently	conciliatory	gesture	when,	shortly	after	polls	closed	but	with	his	victory	not	yet	confirmed,	he	invited
Trzaskowski	to	the	presidential	palace	to	formally	end	the	campaign	with	a	public	handshake.
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However,	except	on	a	few	rare	occasions,	up	until	now	Duda	has	not	made	any	serious	attempts	to	develop	the
kind	of	distinctive	political	agenda	required	to	transcend	the	government-opposition	divide.	In	many	ways,	this	is	not
surprising	as	Duda	broadly	agrees	with	much	of	Law	and	Justice’s	critique	of	the	alleged	dysfunctionality	of	the
post-communist	state	and	its	core	institutions;	his	disagreements	are	generally	over	how	radical	reforms	should	be
and	the	best	means	of	achieving	them.	But	part	of	the	problem	here	is	also	the	fact	that,	up	until	now,	Duda	has
preferred	to	surround	himself	with	technocrats	rather	than	experienced	political	operators.	If	Duda	wants	to	go
beyond	occasional	disagreements	over	tactics	or	the	pace	of	reforms,	and	carry	forward	his	independent	initiatives
more	effectively,	then	he	will	need	to	develop	a	much	clearer	defining	concept	for	his	second	term,	and	a	stronger
intellectual	and	political	support	base	to	carry	it	forward.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	originally	appeared	at	Aleks	Szczerbiak’s	personal	blog.	The	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,
not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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